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CASE NOTES
ex rel. Carter vs. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451, 33 A.L.R. 269;
Maercker vs. Milwaukee, 151 Wis. 324, 139 N.W. 199, L.R.A. 1915 F,
1196 annotated cases 1914 B, 199.)
To the second argument the court said that the amendment was
valid although to a void ordinance because it was an amendment by
name only, being in substance and manner of adoption an enactment,
and therefore of an independent character. Here the court quoted from
the appellant's own concession, "that an ostensible amendment of a
void ordinance may in fact be an entirely new ordinance operating
entirely prospectively and entirely free from dependence on a former
void ordinance and therefore valid as a new ordinance."
To the third argument the court answered that the penalty of the
original invalid ordinance was carried over into the amendment by its
very terms and that the legislative intent by the subsequent amend-
ment was to cure the invalid act. Hence the ordinance had a penalty.
And finally to the fourth contention the court remarked, "The
reservation in the ordinance to the effect that the common council
might upon petition, after public notice and hearing, and after report
by its committee, make changes in the district, does not affect the
appellant. The record is barren of any evidence that the common coun-
cil ever granted a permit to any person, firm, or corporation for any
use not in conformity with the ordinance. The appellant's rights are
not affected by that provision, and his objection in this particular is
not well founded. Gorieb vs. Fox. 274 U.S. 603, 47 S. Ct. 675, 71 L.
Ed. 1228, 53 A.I.R. 1210."
The law of this case is in accord with the generally accepted views
(See R.C.L. and Corpus Juris under Zoning and Constitutional Law-.
Police Powers) that a municipality has the right to regulate zoning if
it acts within reason for the public good without seeking to determine
in what manner any premises in the restricted district shall be used,
and further that an amendment to a void ordinance is valid if the
amendment is to cure the defect of the prior invalid ordinance, and
is so complete and sufficient unto itself as to be virtually independent
of the invalid ordinance.
By increasing an already long line of authorities, the decision tends
to settle more thoroughly the rights of a municipality with respect to
zoning.
CLYDE SHEETS.
PERSONAL PROPERTY-SALES-FRAuDULENT CONVEYANCES. Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Hughes, et al. 237 N.W. 77 (Wis.). Justice
Wickhem, in this case resolves the matters of law involved into two
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queries, "First, did the defendant partners, Hughes and Cujak, falsely
and fraudulently misrepresent their net worth to the plaintiff in such
a way as to give the plaintiff the right to rescind the contract as to
Hughes and Cujak; second, assuming that the first question is answered
in the affirmative and that the title of Hughes and Cujak to the goods
sold was defective and voidable, was the defendant Chaimson an inno-
cent purchaser for value and entitled to take free and clear from the
plaintiff's equity of rescission?"
It seems that in the instant case the International Shoe Company
sued in replevin to recover the possession of certain stock sold to
Hughes and Cujak, partners doing business as the H. &. C. Bootery.
Upon the strength of a financial statement offered by the partnership
the plaintiff shipped a desired number of shoes to the defendants. A
similar subsequent order was held up, pending a second financial state-
ment; this further statement showed a $1,500 increase in assets, so the
defendant shipped more stock: Later, being in failing circumstances,
the partners contracted for the sale of their stock and fixtures to one
Chaimson. Having received the bill of sale, Chaimson notified all credi-
tors of the transaction. Plaintiff elected to rescind the sale of second
shipment of goods. After the action had been commenced, Hughes and
Cujak filed petition in bankruptcy.
The evidence showed that the second financial statement failed to
list as partnership obligations debts amounting to $3,500, which one
partner had incurred by borrowing on his personal credit, proceeds of
which were used to pay partnership debts and which he expected the
partnership to repay to him. The evidence further showed 'hat there
were no adequate books of account, the only method of listing liabili-
ties being adding up bills upon the spindle, and that hardly three months
after making the second statement the H. & C. Bootery was insolvent,
owing almost six times the obligations listed in the statement, and with
considerably less than one-half the assets claimed by the statement.
The Wisconsin court responds to this situation in much the same
way that another court reacted to a somewhat analogous state of
affairs; in Fechheimer & Co. v. Solomon, 33 Fed. 787, 2 L.R.A. 153,
the learned judge remarks-"For this startling transformation of their
condition they offer neither explanation nor excuse. There had been no
disaster from flood or fire, no epidemic, none of those extraordinary
circumstances which at times cause the stoutest houses to tremble."
The Wisconsin justices seem satisfied that the transformation in the
case at hand was startling enough to show misrepresentation of net
worth.
The verdict also indicates satisfaction that the representations were
representations of material facts-made to induce the sale-relied upon
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by the plaintiff-relied upon with a right to do so. Such reliance under
Wisconsin rulings is sufficient to render the sale voidable, whether the
purchaser knew or did not know that the representations were false
provided he either knew or ought to have known the truth of the state-
ments before making them, or provided he made them recklessly. See
First National Vank v. Hackett, 159 Wis. 113, 149 N.W. 703--"Evi-
dence that the defendant in good faith believed the representations
were true is immaterial." Also Krause v. Busacker, 105 Wis. 350, 81
N.W. 406; De Swarte v. First National Bank, 188 Wis 455, 206 NW.
887.
Having determined that the sale was voidable as to the partnership
the court proceeded to analyze the question, whether the defendant
Chaimson was an innocent purchaser for value without notice and
consequently entitled to take free and clear of any claims to rescission
the plaintiff might have. It is stipulated that there was complete com-
pliance with the Bulk Sales Act. (St. 1929, 241.18-241.21. Were this
not true, the sale would have been void under the ruling in Gazette v.
Iola Co-op Mercantile Co., 164 Wis. 406, 160 N.W. 170 (incidentally
the case in which the Bulk Sales Act was held to be a valid extension
of police powers) where the judges ruled thaf "Where a sale of goods
in bulk is void because provisions of the Bulk Sales Act have not
been complied with, the purchaser upon garnishment by creditors of
the seller must hold the goods subject to be reached by garnishment."
In Block v. Brackett, 214 Ill. App. 488, the court sustained the right
of a creditor to cause -execution and levy on property after receiving
notice, stating "there is a manifest intention to afford creditors the
opportunity of taking such steps in regard to the stock of goods as
they may desire, in order to protect themselves. The Wisconsin jurists
do not feel the necessity of ascertaining intention since "if compli-
ance with the Bulk Sales Act prevents title from passing to vendee
or results in his failure to pay value until he receives notice of defect
in title, vendee cannot become an innocent purchaser for value."
The local Supreme Court points out that under Chaimson's agree-
ment property sold remained in the seller for over a month's time,
that the purchase price was not to be paid until a date a month away,
and then only provided no action of attachment or garnishment had
been commenced by any of the seller's creditors and was then pending.
Therefore since Chaimson did not pay value and was not obliged to
do for some time and since he had not so paid, he might be ever so
innocent but he could hardly be designated at purchaser for value.
Therefore, the lower court verdict for the defendant is reversed, and
the cause remanded with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff
in accord with this opinion. BoB HANSEN.
